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The Family State and Forced Youth
Migrations in Wartime Japan (1937–
1945)
L’ État familial et l’exode forcé des enfants et des jeunes au Japon durant la
guerre
L. Halliday Piel
1 This paper examines the disjunction between the state ideology of family in wartime
Japan (1937–1945) and total war policies that tore families apart, even removing children
from their parents’ care and supervision. On the one hand, the militarist government
promoted a romanticized vision of the family as the basis of the nation-state. Since the
Meiji period, state law preserved the paternalistic extended family, despite its erosion by
the forces of modernization. On the other hand, the government adopted “Total War”
policies  that  sent  many  breadwinners  to  battlefields  and  military  factories,  while
encouraging wives and grandparents to volunteer with Administered Mass Organizations.
Government  policies  sent  teenagers  to  colonize  Manchuria  or  work  in  domestic
munitions factories. Towards the end of the war, preteen rural children were pulled from
school to help farmers; many urban children were evacuated from the cities in school
groups  and  sent  to  the  countryside  to  escape  the  Allied  bombing.  How  was  forced
migration justified by the government,  or tolerated by parents in the context of  the
state’s emphasis on family? When parents cooperated with the authorities, were they
merely  following  orders,  or  did  they  see  some  benefit  for  their  children  or  for
themselves?  Were  there  times  when they refused to  cooperate?  These  questions  are
addressed in the context  of  three types of  youth migration:  (1)  “Young Pioneers” in
Manchuria, (2) student conscript labor, and (3) school evacuations. A comparison of the
three shows the differing motives of the state and the parents.
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Types of Forced Youth Migration in Wartime Japan
2 Several  types  of youth  migration  took  place  that  were  government-sponsored  and
“forced” to varying degrees. At the start of the war with China in 1937, the National Diet
approved sending farm boys between the ages of sixteen and nineteen to communes in
Manchuria,  a  puppet  state  of  Japan controlled  by  the  Japanese  North  China  Army (
Kantōgun) since 1931. These boys, who had finished elementary school but were too young
for military service, would serve Japan’s colonial objectives by learning how to become
homesteaders and leaders of future Japanese settlements. The Hirota Cabinet hoped to
send a million Japanese families to Manchuria over a twenty-year period in order to
alleviate population pressure in Japan and construct a utopia called the Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity  Sphere  (Dai-tōa  kyōeiken).  The  government  managed to  recruit  roughly
86,000 youths between the ages of 14 and 21. Some 24,000 perished or disappeared by the
war’s end. They were organized in brigades called the Manchu-Mongol Pioneer Youth
Loyal and Brave Army (Man-Mō kaitaku seishōnen giyūgun), hereafter referred to as Young
Pioneers.
3 The war intensified after Pearl Harbor with a second front opening in the Pacific. Starting
in December 1941,  the National Diet began passing emergency mobilization laws that
pulled male and female students out of middle school and high school to replace adult
factory and farm workers who had been called to war. An estimated 3,100,000 students
were called up to work in factories and farms. At first, it was limited to summer vacations
or short-term shifts. By June 1943, the Tōjō Cabinet extended the shifts to boost aircraft
production. To that end, the 1943 Wartime Special Ordinance for the Factory Act was
enacted  to  lower  the  minimum  age  of  employment  from sixteen  to  eleven.  College
deferments ceased; male university students had to enroll in the army. In October, the
Koiso cabinet ordered schools to devote one-third of  class time to labor service.  The
Emergency Student Labor Mobilization Strategy Outline of January 1944 (Kinkyū gakuto
kinrō dōin hōsaku yōkō) paved the way for successive year-long shifts.1
4 Towards the end of the war, the government evacuated half a million children between
the ages of eight and twelve in school groups from Okinawa and twelve major cities to
escape the American bombardment. There may have been as many as 400,000 orphans as
a result of the American firebombing.2 Some orphans were placed with foster families;
others became homeless, begging for food in train stations, sometimes dying of hunger
and exposure.  Periodically,  the local  police  would round them up and send them to
understaffed and insufficiently funded shelters and reformatories. There were few public
shelters for children until the end of the American Occupation.3
 
Prior Research on Forced Youth Migration in Wartime
Japan
5 Historians tend to approach Japanese youth migration from the perspective of human
rights. This is because much of the source material has been gathered by associations of
former  child  migrants,  who  view  themselves  as  forgotten  war  victims  deserving
compensation  from  the  government.  They  argue that  even  if  they  participated
voluntarily or with enthusiasm, it was not possible for children to resist policies designed
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by  and  carried  out  by  adults.  Sakuramoto  Tomio  argued  in  1987  that  government
campaigns deceived the youth it sent to Manchuria with false promises, and put them in
harm’s  way  on  the  Siberian  border,  abandoning  them when the  Soviets  attacked  in
August 1945.4 In 1999, the Association to Document Student Conscript Labor in Kanagawa
prefecture  (Kanagawa  no  gakuto  kinrō  dōin  o  kiroku  suru  kai),  hereafter  referred  to  as
Kanagawa Association, published the stories of youth laborers, many of whom suffered
illness,  injury,  and death. One of its contributing members,  Sasaya Kōji,  believes that
teenage labor service has received less attention in recent times than other facets of war
life affecting youth. The Kanagawa Association’s purpose is to raise awareness and keep
the sacrifice of youth laborers alive in national memory.5 Kaneda Mari, a war orphan and
an activist with the Japan Association of Families of War Victims (Nihon sensai izoku kai,
1977–…), documented the fate of school children orphaned during evacuations to show
that  school  evacuations  produced  victims  deserving  recognition  and  financial
compensation.6
6 Historians  have  also  examined the  role  of  state  education in  furthering government
policies.  For  instance,  the  Nagano  Prefectural  Association  of  History  Educators
investigated how the Shinano Education Association (Shinano kyōiku kai)  recruited the
highest number of Young Pioneers in the country. It questioned the purpose of public
education, hoping to prevent future complicity with imperialism.7 More recently in 2008,
Shiratori  Michihirō,  editor  of  a  seven-volume  compilation  of  documents  on  youth
migrants to Manchuria, disputes the influential view of the displacement as “cruelty to
children,” advanced in 1974 by children’s literature specialist, Kami Shōichirō. He sees it
as a logical extension of wartime public education, combining technical training, hands-
on work experience, and patriotic service to the nation.8 This paper differs from prior
research in that it  examines Japanese youth migration during the Second World War
through the lens of Japanese family ideology.
 
The Japanese Household (ie) and the Family-State
Ideology (ie seidō)
7 Pre-war Japanese family structure was shaped by the Household Registration Law (koseki
hō) of 1872 and the Meiji Civil Code of 1898 (Meiji minpō). Enacted during the Meiji period
of  modernization  (1828–1911),  these  laws  nevertheless  preserved  aspects  of  samurai
family tradition of the Edo period (1600–1868), namely the extended family composed of a
stem  family  and  collateral  branches,  headed  by  a  male  head  of  household.  Family
relationships  were  tracked  by  means  of  a  registration  system.  Although  sons  could
establish separate residences, they were legally subject to the house head. The household
(ie)  was  more  than  the  sum  total  of  its  living  members.  It  was  in  many  cases  an
occupation, as well as a lineage with ancestral spirits who required ritual appeasement. If
he lacked a male heir, the house head could adopt one from a collateral branch. The
adopted son was expected to marry a daughter of the house and take her name.
8 Systemized by laws, the household system (ie seido) enabled the government to retain
contact with the masses through their house heads, who were legally accountable to for
the behavior of family members. The household system provided a security net for those
who fell sick or lost their jobs. It was also a useful metaphor for the relationship between
the  emperor  and  the  people.  Meiji  leaders  portrayed the  emperor  as  the  head  of  a
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national stem family. Thus, ordinary families were collateral branches of the national
line, and the household system was therefore a basis of national pride and identity.
9 Nevertheless,  it  was  not  above criticism.  During the 1870s  and 1880s,  leaders  of  the
Popular  Rights  Movement,  such as  Ueki  Emori  (1857–1892),  criticized the patriarchal
Confucian basis  of  family.  The  feminist  Kishida  Toshiko  (1864–1901)  called for  equal
rights for wives and political representation for female house heads (who existed in the
absence of male heirs, but did not share the same privileges). Japan’s first modern Civil
Code, proposed to the National Diet in 1890, reflected these concerns. Drafted on the
French model with the help of the renowned legal expert Gustave Emile Boissonade de
Fontarabie (1825–1910), it would have allowed free choice in marriage, equal rights in
divorce, and the freedom to choose one’s own domicile.9 However, several conservative
lawyers argued that the French idea of natural and inalienable rights contradicted the
social hierarchy and the supremacy of a divine ruler. An editorial in the Tokyo Economic
Journal of 22 August 1891 declared that the Civil Code would undermine the very basis of
Japan  by  replacing  the  Confucian  harmony  between  father  and  son,  or  master  and
servant, with contractual relationships.10
10 After a heated debate, those in favor of individual rights lost, and the Civil Code was
rewritten in 1898 along Prussian lines to maintain established hierarchies. The family
superseded the individual in matters such as voting, marrying, paying taxes, or choosing
occupations.  For  instance,  Article  772 required parental  consent  to  marry under  age
thirty (for males) and twenty-five (for females), even though twenty was the legal age of
majority.  Unmarried men and women remained under the guardianship of the house
head, or in his absence, the “family council,” a body composed of three or four relatives
who made decisions for dependents. The law enabled parents and guardians to arrange
marriages in the interest of the family rather than according to the preferences of the
individuals involved.  A wife or an adopted son-in-law who had married into another
household would lose custody of the children upon divorce, as the children belonged to
the ie and not to individual parents (Art. 801 and 81211). The system made it theoretically
difficult for youth to make independent decisions.
11 Yet,  Japanese  family  structure  was  not  static.  Industrialization  and  urbanization
gradually reshaped family structure into the nuclear model. A study, first published in
1937 by Toda Teizō and based on the national census of 1920, suggests that the highest
percentage of families in several urban and rural areas consisted of the nuclear family
with a husband, wife, and children (39.57%). In the cities, there were couples without
children and single persons living alone or in dormitories. Meanwhile, the countryside,
where the extended family still survived (31.96%), was depopulating.12 In fact, so many
teenage girls left their natal villages for factory jobs in the cities that there was a shortage
of nursemaids (komori) for childcare on the farms, according to Kathleen Uno, who has
written about the rise of charitable daycare centers as a response to the working poor.
According to one estimate, more women worked outside the home in 1920 (over 55%)
than in 1990 (under 45%). With fathers working outside the home, and grandfathers and
uncles far away, many children grew up under their mothers’ authority without directly
experiencing the ideal family system.13 Furthermore, discourse on individual rights did
not disappear. It resurged during the liberal period of the Taishō Democracy Movement
(1912–1926), resulting in suffrage for males over twenty-five.
12 Given the demographic changes, conservatives could not rely on laws to maintain the
family  system.  They  also  needed  propaganda.  In  response  to  the  Popular  Rights
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Movement,  the  Meiji  emperor’s  personal  tutor  Motoda  Eifu  (1818–1891)  penned  an
imperial  edict,  the Great Principles of Education (Kyōgaku taishi),  in which he blamed
Western individualism and utilitarianism for corrupting the young. He called for a return
to “ancestral teachings” and “the study of Confucius.” Motoda and his patron, the Meiji
emperor, examined the 1881 General Plan of Regulation for Elementary Schools (Shōgakkō
kyōsoku kōryō), and asked its chief compiler Egi Kazuyuki (1853–1932) to include as history
the mythical founding of Japan by the gods. By 1884, Motoda’s next book Essentials of
Learning for the Young (Yōgaku kōyō) was circulating widely in the public schools. Cultural
nationalists, such as Nishimura Shigeki (1828–1902), shared Motoda’s fear that Japanese
identity would disappear if Western culture were to be adopted uncritically. Nishimura
devised his own Moral Primer for Elementary Schools (Shōgaku shūshin kun) in 1880, which
contained traditional axioms of filiality, including reverence for the emperor as father of
the nation.14
13 From 1881  onwards,  the  Ministry  of  Education  increased  the  school  hours  spent  on
nationalism  and  moral  education.  Authors  of  history  textbooks  were  careful  not  to
criticize the imperial family. An instruction manual for a 1910 set of moral primers tells
teachers to speak of the emperor “in a grave, respectful way that would impress upon the
children the respect and awe with which everyone should address the emperor.” Under
education  minister  Mori  Arinori,  the  Imperial  Decree  of  April  1886  described  the
elementary school as the vehicle for training the Japanese people to “revere the emperor
and love the nation.” However, the emperor’s tutor Motoda harshly criticized Mori for
promoting  science  instead  of  Confucianism.  Two  years  later  in  1889, Mori  was
assassinated by a conservative extremist.15
14 Motoda then co-authored the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 (Kyōiku ni kansuru
chokugo), a document defining the spirit of education in the growing Japanese empire. It
exhorted Japanese subjects to uphold the five Confucian relationships in their personal
lives, to respect the government, and support the emperor, who is “coeval with Heaven
and Earth.” Students and teachers were expected to recite the rescript during school
ceremonies and to venerate an imperial portrait distributed to each school. Given that
school enrollment surpassed 90% by 1905, we may assume that almost all children and
adults who went through the public school system after 1905 grew up with an awareness
of family as a microcosm of the nation headed by the emperor. Whether they practiced it
personally or not, they understood that respect for emperor began in the home with
respect for parents. Furthermore, having recited the imperial rescript countless times at
school,  they  would  have  been  familiar  with  the  exhortation  “to  offer  yourselves
courageously to the State.” School textbooks glamorized self-sacrifice in stories about
war  heroes  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War  (1884–1885)  and  the  Russo-Japanese  War
(1894-1895).
15 After thirty years of family-state ideology, Japanese parents at the start of the China war
in 1937 could be expected to make sacrifices for the emperor, even if it meant sending
children  to  distant  lands  to  labor  for  empire.  However,  the  extent  to  which  they
cooperated or refused when the safety of their own child was at stake raises interesting
questions  about  whether  emperor-centered  nationalism and  the  strong  emphasis  on
respect for parents in family life were actually in harmony or in competition.
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Forced Migration — Cooperation with and Resistance:
The Young Pioneers
16 In the case of  youth migration to Manchuria,  the government’s  concern with family
cohesion for patriotism became secondary to its imperial goal of “sending excellent youth
in large numbers to Manchuria to fulfill the national policy of large-scale immigration in
order to carry out the ideals of Japanese-Manchurian coexistence and co-prosperity.16”
According to a survey, only 869 (8%) Young Pioneers out of 10,131 in the sixth year of the
program had relatives among the immigrants in Manchuria, which means that most boys
were separated from their families.17 We would expect families to comply because of
patriotism.  However,  the  planners  understood  that  patriotism  alone  might  not  be
sufficient to overcome parental attachment to sons, especially if they contributed to the
family economy.
17 Katō  Kanji  (1884-1967)  evidently  understood  the  potential  objections  when  he  first
proposed the program in 1937.  He wrote,  “parents and elders will  happily cooperate
without reservations” if recruiters offer the boys a “more meaningful war service to the
country” through a training program “that would open the door to a life that fulfills their
hopes.” Katō  was a proponent of “peasantism” (nōhon-shugi),  a movement to preserve
rural farm life in face of modernization. The movement had become reactionary and
nationalistic by the 1920s, but Katō was not merely an ideologue; he was pragmatic. As an
official  in  the  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,  Katō  had  worked  with  farmers,  founding
agricultural  schools  and  farmers’  cooperatives  in  Ibaragi,  Aichi,  and  Yamagata
prefectures. His Young Pioneer program offered free agricultural training, supposedly
equivalent to post-elementary education. (In Japan, only elementary school was free).
Each Young Pioneer was promised 10 chōbu (roughly 10 hectares) of land in Manchuria
and permission to marry after graduation. Such benefits attracted ambitious rural youth
without means or opportunities.18
18 Katō deliberately targeted second and third sons, knowing that children were not equal in
value under a household system based on primogeniture. Historically, small landholders
and landless tenant farmers lacked the resources to set up collateral families for younger
sons. In some villages, younger sons had been forbidden to marry. If their labor was not
needed at  home,  there were few options besides entering another farm family as an
adopted son-in-law or an indentured servant, or obtaining a temporary permit to leave
the  village  for  seasonal  work  as  day  laborers  (dekasegi).  Modernization  brought  the
opportunity of  factory employment,  but it  still  meant leaving the safety of  home on
completion of elementary school.  As Katō  points out: “In recent times, not only have
many boys already left their farm villages to work in military factories, but we calculate
that  there are  about  two hundred thousand who have reached the minimum age of
employment, and will leave the villages.” Since there was already a tradition of migrant
youth looking for better opportunities, why not tap into it?
19 Recruiters from the army and the administered mass organizations visited schools, gave
talks, and handed out propaganda pamphlets. One such pamphlet, You too can become a
Young Pioneer, uses cute cartoons to illustrate the lifestyle and perks that a Young Pioneer
might expect from the program. A cartoon shows a Young Pioneer shaking hands with a
grateful Manchurian boy, no doubt a nod to the concept of the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. Other than that,  the patriotic message seems muted, limited to the following
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statement in the preface: “Everyone has already heard a hundred or two hundred times
about the great mission of the Young Pioneers. Since a perfect chance like this comes
along only rarely, we encourage you to bolster your courage, steel your resolve, and seize
the opportunity to give your strength to support our country’s continental policy.19”
20 Memoirs and surviving school essays indicate that upward mobility was as important a
reason as patriotic loyalty for cooperating with the state. Nakamura Akio (1927–?) recalls
in his autobiography how as a boy he decided to go to Manchuria when he grew up “to
make a household I would not be ashamed of.” His parents listened quietly to his plan and
nodded. His father remarked that he could probably “eat better over there.20” “I like
farming,” a schoolboy wrote in an essay published in a boys’ magazine in 1940. “I’m the
third son, my parents gave me permission to go, so I want to somehow get admitted to
the  corps.”  In  his  opinion,  Japan  was  “too  small  and  cramped  for  farming.”  Either
Manchuria or Brazil would be better. His mother, he wrote, agreed and urged his older
brother to do the same: “Go to Manchuria, get lucky, make money and come back.” The
magazine editor praised the boy’s resolve while correcting his reasoning. “Y-kun needs to
reflect on his motivations,” he commented. “The attitude of his mother, telling the boys
to join in order to get the promised ten chō of land does not match the aims of Young
Pioneers.” He then explained to his young readers that going to Manchuria was not the
same thing as emigrating to South America or Hawaii for a better life. The purpose was to
“build the nation” in the same way that the annexation of Hokkaidō in the Meiji period
enlarged Japan.21
21 The editor’s reaction suggests a gap between parental and state expectations, but the way
in which program was marketed to emphasize personal benefits is probably a reflection
of Katō’s interest in finding a “solution” for an impoverished sector of society with a
history of tenant-farmer strikes, seen as politically destabilizing by the government. In
his initial proposal, Katō argued that the Young Pioneer program would provide useful
training  and  discipline  for  youth  who  might  otherwise  become  troublesome  and
dissolute: “They congregate in the cities, where some remain unemployed, others attract
the bad elements of society, or else they become the cause of social problems and thought
crimes.” By “thought crimes” Katō was referring to Communism and anti-war or anti-
government  political  views.  At  least  in  Manchuria,  he  reasoned,  the  boys  would  be
working for their own future and that of Japan.22
22 Survey questionnaires show that 90.7% of the 26,425 boys admitted in 1938 to Young
Pioneer training camps, including the flagship in Ibaraki prefecture’s Uchihara City came
from  farm  villages,  and  77.1%  identified  their  family  occupation  as  farming.23 This
remained true until the end of the war. Furthermore, the majority were second and third
sons  (70.2%),  mainly  between  age  15  and  16,  of  whom  a  respectable  number  were
academically gifted. Out of 8,2000 recruits in April 1940, 1,088 had been class leaders or
assistant class leaders, precisely the sort of ambitious youth without opportunities who
would be interested in the promise of free education.24
23 In 1939, a year after the first wave of Young Pioneers, applicants dropped by 60% to 9,508,
well short of the government’s goal of 30,000. Sakuramoto suspects that deserters and
travelers brought home unfavorable reports of  conditions in Manchuria.  He cites the
minutes of an agricultural association meeting in Osaka, in which an official doubted the
educational value of the Young Pioneer camps in Manchuria, and concluded, “It is not
good to separate such young lads from their mothers.25” Nakamura recalls staying at an
inn on the eve of his departure by boat for Manchuria when a maid asked, “Who on earth
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told you to go to Manchuria? Your teachers? Your parents?” Nakamura’s best  friend
retorted, “What are you saying? Nobody told us to go. If we don’t go to Manchuria and
reclaim land, who will?” Nakamura recalls, “With tears in her eyes while serving dinner,
the maid said, ‘If you go to Manchuria, you will die for sure’.26”
24 Parental consent was supposedly required, so it is interesting to find that 42.5% of survey
respondents in 1941 said that they had joined the Young Pioneers over the objections of
their families. The number climbed to 49.2% in 1942. The survey distinguishes between
family members who voiced doubts and those who objected right up to the end (meaning
that they were not swayed by the “parent meetings” organized by associations involved
in recruitment27). Clearly, the state favored the child’s individual choice over the family’s
right to control him when it suited the state’s interests.
25 There is no comparative data for 1938, but we wonder whether the purpose of the 1941
survey was to find out if parental resistance was a factor in the decline of applicants.
Respondents overwhelmingly said they joined because of a teacher (3,422 in 1941 and
5,817 in 1944). Joining because of a parent was a distant third place in both years (429 in
1941 and 896 in 1944). Propaganda in the media took second place in 1944 (with 1,329
respondents28). It is likely that parental consent declined as the war dragged on and the
risks became more obvious.
 
Forced Migration — Cooperation with and Resistance:
Student laborers
26 The top high school for girls in Sendai, Miyagi prefecture, received government orders in
autumn 1944 to recruit 100 girls from a pool of 200 fourth-year students to work in the
Zushi naval factory in Kanagawa prefecture, just south of Tokyo. Kanagawa was home to a
large  number  of  military-industrial  facilities.  There  were  not  enough  students  in
Kanagawa to fill  the demand,  so an additional  22,500 students were brought in from
Hokkaidō  and the six prefectures of Tōhoku (including Miyagi), the traditionally poor
northeast. They lived in barracks along with their homeroom teachers. Some six to eight
thousand youth from Taiwan also worked in Kanagawa, volunteering in the same way as
the Young Pioneers.29 A collection of memoirs and diaries by the Miyagi high school girls
was published after the war, revealing that many were eager to sign up, and excited to
leave home on what seemed like an adventure. Since student conscript workers were
typically given a ceremonial send-off like a soldier departing for war, it was a chance for a
girl to feel like a hero, a Yamato nadeshiku (the name of a flower and an idiom for ideal
feminine beauty30).
27 At first, only twenty girls received parental permission to volunteer. “I will never forget
the day when the school principal Moroishi sensei summoned us to the assembly hall and
shouted, ‘You are traitors to your country,’” Miyoshi Hiroko recalls. “We all wanted to be
of use to the country. Only, our parents were worried and said no to the school. Given the
situation, the principal’s words wounded our pure maiden hearts. Deeply mortified we
begged to go to Zushi.” In the end, parental approval, although desirable, was actually
unnecessary,  and the school was able to gather a number of  volunteers.  As with the
Young  Pioneers,  the  state  paid  lip  service  to  filiality,  but  ignored  it  when  parents’
decisions  were  not  in  harmony  with  state  policy.  Nevertheless,  during  the  morning
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ceremony (chōrei) at the factory in Zushi, the girls were expected to bow in the direction
of their native Miyagi and say, “Good morning mother and father.31”
28 The Ministry of Education’s 1941 moral primer for students, The Way of Subjects (Shinmin
no michi), shifted the emphasis in family-state propaganda from filial piety (respect for
parents) and loyalty (obedience to emperor) to filial piety equals loyalty. The Ministry’s
previous major propaganda tract, the 1937 Fundamentals of Our National Polity (Kokutai
no hongi), defined filial piety and loyalty under separate headings, linking them somewhat
loosely: “The direct object of filial piety is one’s parents, but in its relationship with the
emperor finds a place within loyalty.” The Way of Subjects ,  published four years later,
conflates filial piety with loyalty more blatantly to emphasize loyalty:
“In  Japan,  filial  piety  cannot exist  singly  without  its  absolute  counterpart.  It  is
loyalty. Loyalty is the principle. Filial piety at home must be loyalty. Both are one
and inseparable […] The first requisite of filial piety is to fulfill the duty of subjects
to guard and maintain the Imperial Throne in observance of the bequeathed will of
their ancestors.32”
29 Thus, filial piety became loyalty to emperor, as if to emphasize more clearly that a child’s
first  duty  was  to  emperor  rather  than  father.  This  nuance  provides  a  rationale  for
allowing minors to disobey parents in the interests of the state.
30 Compared to the Young Pioneers program, student factory labor presented few benefits
for the child in the eyes of parents. Certainly it was paid. From May 1944, the wages for
students in the third year of middle school and above were equivalent to the starting
salary of an elementary-school graduate, with boys earning fifty Yen per month, and girls
earning forty Yen per month. The amount was not negligible.  However,  the students
themselves  almost  never  received  wages  directly.  After  fees  and  taxes  for  school
expenses,  transportation  and  lodging  were  deducted,  the  remainder  was  usually
deposited by the school principal directly into the postal savings system or the national
bank to be distributed after the war. In the case of the Yokosuka High School for girls, the
remainder appears to have been paid in cash to the parents, which would have been
unusual.33
31 One could argue that there was a tradition among farm girls of the northeast to work
before marriage, so labor service could not have been much different. However, the girls
who entered into indentured service as maids, waitresses, geisha, and textile workers
belonged to the same tenant farmer cohort as the boys who joined the Young Pioneers.
Those who were called up for student labor service came from families that could afford
higher education. Many would have been aiming to become teachers or marry their
educated male counterparts aspiring for white-collar jobs. Factory work did not present
any benefit of upward mobility. To the contrary, it disrupted education, and the risks
were plainly visible to parents, especially after the devastating firebombing of Tokyo in
March 1945.  Ishikawa Kiyoko recalls  that  at  age  15  she  left  her  hometown in  Iwate
prefecture for labor service in Kanagawa. Since she wished to attend a women’s medical
school, she was placed in a factory that supposedly accommodated students studying for
exams. “Call it studying if you will, but all I could do was read the books I had at hand.
There were no classes, and our supervisors were teachers of literature and sewing, who
could not answer my questions.34”
32 Statistics are lacking, but memoirs gathered by the Kanagawa Association suggest that
there were parents and teachers who actively disobeyed and abducted their children in
the last  year  of  the war.  Parent-teacher  associations  met  with school  principals  and
The Family State and Forced Youth Migrations in Wartime Japan (1937–1...
Revue d’histoire de l’enfance « irrégulière », 15 | 2015
9
demanded that their daughters be released from service in Tokyo and assigned to war
work  in  their  hometowns.  The  school  principals,  who  were  technically  government
officials  responsible  for  disseminating  the  state’s  propaganda  in  the  classroom,
nevertheless  sided  with  the  parents,  acting  as  their  representatives.  Along  with  the
homeroom teachers,  they attempted to negotiate with military overseers and civilian
managers of factories.
33 When students reached the age of graduation, teachers had a window of opportunity to
send them home before they were reclassified as  adult  conscript  workers.  Hosokowa
Shōko of Tōhoku Women’s High School recalls overhearing two teachers discussing a plan
to send the students home. Late at night in the factory dorm, the teachers coached the
students on how to draft and send out résumés for jobs in her native Iwate prefecture.
Hosokawa remembers accompanying the teachers to plead their case before a manager of
Hitachi  Precision  Instruments,  who  fortunately  was  sympathetic.  “Many  boys  in  my
hometown have gone to war,  so there are not enough workers,” Hosokawa told him.
“Whether I work in this factory or work in my hometown, I am doing my duty for the
war, so please let me go home.” Her teachers added: “We would like to send the students
safely  back  to  their  parents.”  They  fully  expected  to  be  reprimanded  on  return  to
Morioka City, but local officials congratulated them for bringing home the entire class.35
Similarly,  the  parents  of  fifty  graduating  seniors  of  Toyoma  Women’s  High  School
petitioned the school principal to negotiate with the Navy to send their daughters home
to Miyagi prefecture, instead of extending their contracts after graduation. A jealous co-
worker from another school in the same Yokosuka Naval Yard later accused the Toyoma
girls of running away from duty. The teacher who arranged it faced stigma even after the
war, telling his former students, “I don’t want to remember that nightmare.” Apparently,
the Ishinomaki branch of the Special Higher Police investigated the school.36
34 Students who were too young to graduate were harder to rescue. Parents of third-year
students  from Mizusawa Higher  Women’s  School  became agitated  upon news  of  the
March 1945 firebombing of Tokyo. Teacher Kikuchi Taneyuki failed to obtain permission
to release the ninety-five girls in his charge at the Tokyo Aviation Instruments Company
in Kawasaki, and decided to arrange for them to run away. Obtaining train tickets for
large groups without permission was almost impossible; desperate civilians stood in line
for hours to buy tickets to escape the city. Luckily, he found an individual in the Tokyo
rail office who was willing to make a private deal. As the girls fled the dorms, leaving
behind all but their most important possessions, the dorm supervisor threatened to call
the kenpeitai  (military police).  Kikuchi  was detained at  his  school  under house arrest
“until  further  notice,”  but  was  allowed  to  go  free  when  all  workers  were  officially
released after  a  bomb destroyed the factory.37 Others  were not  so lucky.  A group of
concerned parents devised a “group escape plan” for Aizu Middle School students in a
Kawasaki  factory,  obtaining train tickets  with great  difficulty.  However,  the kenpeitai
thwarted the plan, arresting the supervising teacher.38
 
Family Ideology Versus Forced Migration in the Case
of School Evacuees
35 After the shock of the Doolittle Raid in December 1942, Foreign Minister Kase Toshikazu
and General Tatsumi Eiichi advised Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki to evacuate non-essential
civilians from the cities. General Tatsumi had witnessed the London Blitz while serving as
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military attaché to the Japanese Embassy in London. Tōjō objected:  “The spirit of the
people resides in Japan’s household system, and requires the will to stick together no
matter what. Splitting up families through such things as evacuations is preposterous.39”
His  view of  the  household system as  the  basis  of  national  morale  is  simply another
articulation of the family-state ideology in the textbooks and the 1890 imperial rescript.
In other words, it was the standard view. Nevertheless, the state had already separated
many  teenagers  from  their  families  for  the  war  effort.  Perhaps  the  problem  with
evacuation is that the expense it would incur would not be offset by productive labor. The
state’s resources were already stretched thin by war on multiple fronts.
36 In the opinion of Naito Ikuji, an educator and one of the earliest chroniclers of school
evacuations, the novelist Nogami Yaeko (1885–1985) may have been the first to publicly
challenge Tōjō’s view. Nogami pointed out the hypocrisy of his position in her newspaper
editorial, “Evacuation of the Population and the Problem of School Children,” serialized
in the Asahi newspaper over a three-day period (28-30 January 1944).  “If  it  were the
peacetime Japan of yesterday, we would directly oppose it on the grounds that taking
children away from their mothers destroys the basis of the household system,” she wrote.
“But currently it  is a time when even housewives are asked to leave the family they
should be protecting and work in factories.” She pointed out there was a tradition of
sending Tokyo children to relatives in the countryside after earthquakes, but “not all
children are so advantaged.40”
37 While recognizing the cost and complexity of  a mass evacuation of children,  Nogami
insisted: “No matter how much money it takes, I believe that it is absolutely necessary at
this stage to move the children to a safe place, and protect their health without stopping
their education.” Unfortunately the children might have to live in make-shift barracks,
but at least, fresh food was more accessible in the countryside. “Since the ideal locations
are remote mountain villages, we will have to create associations of volunteers to educate
the children in the absence of the availability of schools.” Nogami quoted a verse from
Yamanoue no Okura’s well-loved poem, “On Thinking of Children,” in the 8th century
poetry collection, the Man’yōshū: “Not silver, or gold, or precious jewels, could ever match
the far greater treasure that is one’s own child.” Educated readers would have recalled
that Okura added Buddhist references to the poem’s preface, hinting that love for one’s
own  children  is  a  worldly  attachment  impeding  the  path  to  enlightenment.  Yet,  as
literature scholar Haruo Shirane points out, “In the final reckoning, no treasure, not even
the Buddhist seven treasures represented by silver, gold, and jewels, can match his love
for his children.41”
38 Nogami followed up this endorsement of private parental love by acknowledging the state
view that  in  “today’s  Japan,”  children were not  merely  “our  own” children,  but  the
children of the nation (who by implication may be sacrificed for the good of the nation).
She then twists this argument, in Saito’s opinion, by insisting that all Japanese children,
one’s own and others, needed to be protected because they were the future of the nation
that adults were presently fighting to protect.42
39 The Army Ministry secretly issued contingency plans for civilian evacuation in the worst-
case scenario. This shows the divide between the public face of the government, and the
army’s  more  realistic  risk  assessment.  The  army  was  not  answerable  to  the  Prime
Minister;  it  reported  directly  to  the  office  of  emperor.  Nevertheless,  the  civilian
government controlled funds for many civilian purposes. Tōjō’s reluctance delayed the
release of funds. In January 1944, the governor of Tokyo urged civilians to send their
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children to live with relatives in the countryside at their own expense. However, many
urban residents  lacked extended family  relations in the countryside.  While  the ideal
model of family presumed that each household was linked to an ancestral homesite in the
countryside, in actuality many urban residents were the descendents of migrants who
had cut their ties to their roots and started new stem families in the cities. Without the
usual network of relatives to depend on, children of the inner city (shita-machi) needed
state aid.
40 The  American  bombing  of  northern  Kyūshū  on  June  16,  1944  finally  prompted  the
National  Diet  to  authorize  funding  on June  30  to  evacuate  public-school  children in
groups led by their teachers. Handicapped children and those under eight years old were
not  evacuated,  leading  some historians  to  suspect  that  the  primary  motive  was  not
humanitarian, but to free up mothers to work in defense of the country, or to preserve
the future work force until needed.43 Once they turned twelve, evacuees were recalled to
the cities and put to work under the student labor mobilization law. However, the speed
with  which  city  education  boards  and  parent-teacher  associations  rushed  to  action,
raising money, getting evacuations underway by early August, barely a month after the
Diet’s decision, illustrates how urgently parents desired this mass migration.
41 Tokyo’s  chief  education officer  later  recalled  sleepless  nights  trying  to  make all  the
arrangements, such as contacting temples and hot-spring resorts with the capacity to
accommodate large groups. Food was in short supply, but parent-teacher associations
organized food drives, and successfully petitioned the Ministry of Education to increase
its  funding  for  supplies.  Personal  memoirs  indicate  that  parents  privately  mailed  or
delivered extra food to their children. For forty days in July and August, Asahi newspaper
headlines  encouraged  school  evacuation.  Only  Aichi  prefecture  delayed  evacuations
because of parental mistrust.44 Thus, in contrast to previous forced migrations of youth,




42 Through propaganda in the media and the schools, Japan’s leaders told Japanese subjects
that their patriotic duty was to respect and obey the emperor as if he were their father or
house head. This made it easy for the state to override the considerable power of parents
afforded by the Civil Code of 1898, when it was considered strategically necessary for the
war effort. However, the state also had to offer incentives to compensate for splitting up
families,  normally  unacceptable  under  the  family  ideology  because,  regardless  of
patriotism, Japanese parents were understandably keen to protect and preserve their
offspring, even when their sons and daughters were eager to serve their country. Hence
the state promised land and education to the Young Pioneers and wages and study hours
to the student factory workers. In both cases, parents cooperated in the early stages but
became less cooperative as the risks to their children became more apparent with the
worsening  of  the  war.  Conversely,  parents  appear  to  have  welcomed  the  school
evacuation program, perceiving it to be a benefit to their children, even though it meant
splitting up families, sending pre-teen children far from home.
43 Of course, this does not mean that parents of school evacuees always cooperated while
parents  of  conscripted student  laborers  never  did.  There  are  stories  of  parents  who
decided to bring home children evacuated to the countryside who were homesick or
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suffering from hunger and cold because of logistical problems. Meanwhile, the majority
of parents apparently resigned themselves to the patriotic sacrifice of their children to
military  factories  because  the  war  depended  on  it.  Nevertheless,  the  incidents  in
Kanagawa suggest that resistance to factory work, when it did occur, was more organized,
with  parents  and  teachers  conspiring  together,  rather  than  lone  parents  acting
individually. The Japanese state demanded tremendous sacrifice from its people during
the war. When it came to displacing children, however, it could impose its will up to a
point, but propaganda about the family-state ideology may not have played as important
a role as one might expect. Success depended on how invested the parents were in the
benefits of youth migration.
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ABSTRACTS
This  paper  examines the  disjunction  between the  state  ideology  of  family  in  wartime Japan
(1937–1945) and the total war policies that tore families apart, even removing children from their
parents’  care  and  supervision.  On  the  one  hand,  the  militarist  government  promoted  a
romanticized vision of the extended, paternalistic family as the basis of the nation-state. On the
other  hand,  the  government  adopted  “Total  War”  policies  that  sent  many  breadwinners  to
battlefields and military factories, while encouraging wives and grandparents to volunteer with
Administered  Mass  Organizations  (AMO).  Under  the  Hirota  administration,  a  program  was
established to send teenage boys, many as young as 14, to colonize Manchuria. About 86,000 were
sent between 1938 and 1945. The Tôjô administration lowered the factory age limit from 16 to 11
in 1943 to send over a million teenagers, both boys and girls, to live in dormitories and labor in
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munitions  factories  or  farms.  Clearly,  the  government’s  concern  with  family  cohesion  for
patriotism became secondary to its wartime objectives.
How did the family ideology,  supposedly central  to upholding the state,  thrive alongside the
forced separations of children from their families? Examining the language of morals textbooks
issued  to  schools  by  the  Ministry  of  Education,  we  see  that  the  government  promoted  a
nationalist conception of Japan as a “family state,” in which all  Japanese families were to be
considered collateral branches of a “stem family,” headed by the emperor. This made it easy for
the state in the name of the emperor, the supreme family patriarch, to override the considerable
power  of  parents  afforded  by  the  Civil  Code  of  1898,  when  it  was  considered  strategically
necessary  for  the  war  effort.  However,  it  appears  that  Japanese  parents  were  aware  of  the
conflict of interests between the ideological sanctity of the family and the Total War state’s need
to  sacrifice  family  for  the  war  effort.  We  propose  that parents  cooperated  willingly  if  the
perceived benefit for the child outweighed the risk, and resisted cooperation if the perceived risk
outweighed the benefit.
Cet  article  étudie  le  décalage  entre  l’idéologique  familialiste  au  Japon  durant  la  guerre
(1937-1945)  et  les  politiques  de  guerre  totale  qui  ont  déchiré  des  familles,  notamment  en
séparant les enfants de leurs parents. D’une part, le gouvernement militaire prônait une vision
idéaliste de la famille agrandie et paternaliste comme modèle de l’État-nation.
D’autre part,  le  gouvernement avait  adopté des politiques de « guerre totale »,  envoyant  des
chefs de famille au combat et dans les usines militaires, tout en encourageant les femmes et les
grands-parents à se porter volontaires auprès des organisations administratives de masse. Sous
l’administration Hirota, un programme fut mis en place pour envoyer les garçons adolescents,
certains âgés de 14 ans seulement,  coloniser la  Mandchourie.  Environ 86.000 jeunes y furent
envoyés entre 1938 et 1945. L’administration Tôjô rabaissa l’âge limite de travail en usine de 16 à
11 ans dans le but d’envoyer plus d’un million d’adolescents, filles et garçons, vivre dans des
résidences  et  travailler  dans  des  usines  de  munitions  et  des  fermes.  La  préoccupation  du
gouvernement  pour  la  cohésion  familiale  dans  un  souci  de  patriotisme  était  ostensiblement
secondaire par rapport aux objectifs de guerre.
Comment l’idéologie familiale,  soi disant centrale au maintien de l’État,  a-t-elle pu prospérer
alors que les enfants étaient arrachés à leurs familles ? En étudiant de plus près le vocabulaire
des manuels scolaires de morale distribués par le ministère de l’Éducation, on s’aperçoit que le
gouvernement prônait une conception nationaliste du Japon comme « État familial » dans lequel
toutes  les  familles  japonaises  étaient  considérées  comme  des  branches  subsidiaires  d’une
« famille souche » dirigée par l’empereur. Ce système permettait à l’État d’empiéter sur les droits
conférés aux parents par le  Code civil  de 1898,  au nom de l’empereur,  patriarche de famille
suprême, lorsque jugé nécessaire à l’effort de guerre. Cependant, il semblerait que les parents
nippons aient été bien conscients du conflit d’intérêts entre l’idéologie sacrée de la famille et ce
besoin de l’état de guerre totale sacrifiant des familles au nom de l’effort de guerre. Les parents
coopéraient  volontiers  si  l’avantage  pour  l’enfant  semblait  supérieur  au  risque  encouru,  et
étaient plus dans le cas contraire.
INDEX
Mots-clés: migrations forcées, enfance et jeunesse, Japon, seconde guerre mondiale, idéologie
familialiste
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